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Abstract 
‘Beyond their instrumental functions,’ writes Rivka Oxman in an article about 
design, creativity and innovation (2013), ‘advanced digital and computational 
environments are also becoming tools for thinking design’. At the leading 
edge of creativity and innovation design does not only speculate the 
plausible, possible or potential, but pragmatically inserts such futures into the 
present (as Whitehead says any ‘immediate existence’ (1962) must). Using 
concepts mainly from Deleuze, Guattari, Spinoza and Simondon, I will 
position such design speculation as pragmatic, divergent, complex and 
emergent. That is, as manifesting the technical mentalities (Simondon) that 
provide the milieu in which we can show what we ‘might be capable of’ 
(Stengers). 
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‘Immediate existence requires the insertion of the future in the 
crannies of the present.’ 
Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 191 
 
‘Speculative philosophy is not about giving a plausible account of 
what exists but about approaching each society with the question of 
what it might be capable of, and this capacity designates not its 
judgements but the interstices to which it provides shelter.’ 
Isabelle Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, p. 509 
 
Introduction 
There is so much entangled in, and riding upon, the word ‘speculative’: it 
appears to be a term that is not only in vogue, but distorted and over-folded 
by all the applications to which it is put. Philosophers and their friends 
speculate (Bryant et al. 2011), designers speculate (Dunne and Raby 2013), 
historians speculate in producing alternate pasts (Bunzl 2004). The term is in 
constant motion. This is not necessarily a bad thing, of course, and maybe 
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the term’s dynamism warrants its being left alone. The philosopher’s act, 
traditionally thought, of defining terms, of pinning down meaning to 
something that will, ultimately and totally, be under that philosopher’s control 
is one that I would therefore like to forgo. Philosopher, mathematician and 
physicist Alfred North Whitehead writes: ‘Philosophy destroys its usefulness 
when it indulges in brilliant feats of explaining away’ (1978, 17). Philosophy 
should be pragmatic, actualising and material, and in so doing it becomes as 
experimental as any other creative discipline. Pragmatic, we will see, 
because it will generate the new, transform the old, map possibilities, and 
deploy the forces necessary to bring about action. Actualising, because 
philosophy should always make an impact through its creativity, even if its 
creativity is focussed upon the conceptual and transcendental. And material 
because nothing else matters. Philosopher Brian Massumi, in Semblance and 
Event. Activist philosophy and the occurrent arts (2011), emphasises that 
pragmatics is not ‘practical as opposed to speculative or theoretical. It is a 
synonym for composition’ (2011, 12; original emphasis). A speculative 
philosophy can be as pragmatic – material, creative, actual – as anything. 
Furthermore, philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers adds to this opening 
up of the terms speculation, philosophy and pragmatics by writing that: 
‘Speculative presence does not carry out any convergence’ (2011, 509). 
Presence in its speculative mode should diverge, disperse, spread, swerve 
and complexify, to drive away from the certainties of states of equilibrium; 
but so too should speculation in its presentation, as it becomes the present. 
A pragmatic, philosophical speculation on speculation might do well to 
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diverge, swerve and complexify (Hales 2015). My hunch is that anyone 
reading the work collected here has some angle on the speculative, and for 
me to weigh in, converging upon a position to defend seems to be counter-
productive: a divergence of thinking and practicing in this area would 
therefore seem to be beneficial to preserving its creative, intensive 
possibilities.   
 If anything, surely the speculative boom has led to a burgeoning of the 
opportunities for exploring and experimenting with futures through the 
materialisation of possible presences, such that any one attempt to control 
and totalise the multiplicity of perspectives on this matter should be viewed 
with utter suspicion. My intervention, then, will be offered not as part of an 
argument, but pitched into the multitude of options, to see how its affects 
ripple through them precipitating ricochets in different directions.   
 
Machines and Affects 
That digital creativity is aligned with such a project is clear given the words of 
Rivka Oxman contributing to the first edition of The International Journal of 
Design Creativity and Innovation: ‘Beyond their instrumental functions, 
advanced digital and computational environments are also becoming tools 
for thinking design’ (Editorial Board IJDCI 2013, 16; original emphasis). 
Oxman inverts the terms of the recent design-driven innovation trend (‘design 
thinking’) to emphasise that rather than those aspects of design that can be 
identified as ‘thinking’ (then removed and easily instrumentalised), it is the 
ways in which thinking about design, through design and as design that are 
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of importance here.1 I hope to show in this article that developing a 
thoughtful practice and a pragmatic speculation is an important attitude to 
any creative activity. Simondon, as we will see, calls a realm ‘metastable’ 
when creative opportunities abound, and ‘homeostatic’ when all possibilities 
have been exhausted and the creative engine grinds to a halt (Simondon 
1980, 2009). If digital machines can become ‘tools for thinking design’ as 
Oxman proposes, I hope to show in what follows that they will not only be 
inherently speculative as they emerge from the entangling of complex 
topologies (Parisi 2007; Hayward and Geoghegan 2012), but pragmatic too, 
in ways that exceed simplistic notions of function.  
 Writing about machines in an essay called ‘Regimes, Pathways, 
Subjects’ (1992) Félix Guattari says:  
 
People have little reason to turn away from machines; which are 
nothing other than hyperdeveloped and hyperconcentrated forms of 
certain aspects of human subjectivity, and emphatically not those 
aspects that polarize people into relations of domination and power. 
(Guattari 1992, 18) 
 
The urges to polarise are articulated through discourses of form, function and 
substance, for these discourses include notions of propriety and impropriety, 
of ability and disability, of inclusion and exclusion, and so on, especially 
when articulated about bodies, or other agglomerations of matter in space. It 
                                            
1. See also Brassett and Marenko (2015) for a critical evaluation of these issues.  
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is useful to remember how Spinoza treats bodies here. For him bodies 
should not be characterised by reference to form, function and substance, 
but by their speeds and slownesses, and capacities for affecting or being 
affected. He writes: 
 
LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of 
motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of 
substance [. . .] LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be 
determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has 
been determined to motion by a third body, and that third again by a 
fourth, and so on to infinity. (Spinoza 1955, 93) 
 
In LEMMA I, a body is not alone, single, or simple, it is a collection of 
elements, atoms, particles themselves existing under different conditions of 
motion and rest, speed and slowness. The different particles that compose 
the body are not the ends – the aims, finalities or edges – of the body; the 
body is not the sum total of its bits, its points; its organs are not added up to 
provide proper organisation. These points, bits, organs are moving and 
moved through, at various speeds and slownesses: connecting, colliding and 
repulsing but not encompassing. To articulate bodies according to Spinoza’s 
first proposition, then, we must listen to the rhythms according to which the 
speeds and slownesses of their elements are pulsating. Bodies 
conceptualised in this way exist only in relation to each other, and the sum of 
all these relations can never be exhausted. With LEMMA III the determination 
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of the ‘affective capacity’ of a body comes from the disorganisation of its 
ordinary connections within social, scientific, natural, cultural (and so on) 
schema and the allowing of many different properties to be re-connected in 
other, creative, ways. If LEMMA I gives us the possibilities for new 
connections, collisions, or obstacles, LEMMA III engages the forces that 
generate these connections, collisions or obstacles. Speeds and slownesses 
provide the motion of bodies’ particles; affective capacities show the forces 
and directions of the impacts between these particles in motion. If, as 
Guattari states, machines are nothing more than ‘hyperdeveloped and 
hyperconcentrated forms of . . . human subjectivity’ then, via Spinoza’s body, 
they can be considered as sped up or slowed down modes of affecting or 
being affected that traverse all things, humans included. Indeed, this may be 
the point of machines: that they speed up, slow down, connect, disconnect 
(and so on) all the many different flows that can be called ‘affective’. Via 
Spinoza we may see that machines are not ‘hyperdeveloped or 
hyperconcentrated forms of . . . human subjectivity’ as Guattari says, but that 
human subjectivity is a particular, special or partial singularisation of the 
multiple connections, affects, speeds and slownesses enacted by machines. 
In itself this is nothing new; this is the argument of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus (1984) after all. Nevertheless, it positions the importance of the 
machine – and so of us, humans, too – somewhere new: crossing real-
imaginary, actual-virtual, material-metaphysical, practical and theoretical 
boundaries. As these oppositional couples dissolve into and out of each 
other, the affective aspect of Spinoza’s argument and the power and control 
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aspects of Guattari’s align: when forms and functions are relegated in 
importance by thinking of bodies/things as affective machines operating at 
different speeds and slownesses, then the constitution and delivery of affect 
expresses both the ethical and political consequence of their workings. It 
may be that any singular emergence of thing or person contains elements 
under different rates that cross other singularities; at the very least, these 
bodies, their elements and so on will impact each other with various 
qualitative and quantitative levels of disturbance. When our elements are 
shared, or our bodies affect or are affected, we are in the realms of politics 
and ethics (or ethology as Spinoza and Deleuze prefer).  
 A Speculative Machine, then, is such a Spinozistic body: in motion, 
impacting, colliding and repelling. A singularisation of a multiplicity of parts 
that themselves smear through other bodies. It is affecting and being 
affected, speeding up and slowing down, in constant motion and 
occasionally at rest. Its emergence stems from and enables all of these 
different phases. In fact, this is emergence: a self-organising creative whole 
erupting from the relation of myriad particles within a supportive medium. A 
Speculative Machine pulls from these affecting and emerging materialities a 
temporal coefficient. Writing on Simondon, Anne Sauvagnargues (2012) 
refers to this as the bringing together of the topological and the 
chronogenetic: where the complex folding and connecting of space is at 
once a similarly complex, folded and connected time.3 This is highlighted so 
                                            
3. This concept of complex interweaving of space and time is also evident in the work of 
philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard (1969), particularly in the following passage: ‘In its 
countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for’ (Bachelard 
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well in those digital machines materialising as acts of speculation that are 
covered in this volume. Actual and conceptual, they mobilise a number of 
different creative flows in their bringing together and throwing out of futures, 
pasts and presents. 
 The nexus of bodily modes Spinoza announces is of importance to 
those of us interested in Speculative Machines. Unleashed from constraints 
of form, function and substance, the resultant explosion of the body into a 
multiplicity of modes (held in loose configurations, with their constituent 
particles impacting each other and those in/of other bodies at different rates) 
offers opportunities also to rethink designing things more generally. 
Spinoza’s bodies connect, deny, develop and create a range of spatial and 
temporal ontologies describing ways of being for us in a multitude of 
possibilities. Simondon operates similarly. Thinking not of identities, beings 
that are stable over time, Simondon works instead with modes of existence, 
ways of becoming whose processes emerge from the complex interplay of 
space and time (and everything else). The issue then becomes: how might 
the focus on modes of existence – relying, as it does, upon the dispersal of 
body/thing particles across a wide space-time – help articulate a position on 
a material speculation through design? I offer Simondon on technical 
mentality as a way into this question. 
 He explains: ‘technical mentality is coherent, positive, productive in 
the domain of the cognitive schemas, but incomplete and in conflict with 
                                                                                                                             
1969, 8). I discuss the spatial aspects of this more fully elsewhere (see Brassett 1991 and 
1994). The temporal complexities and the consequences for rethinking causality are 
examined in De Boever et al. (2012), Massumi (2011) and Whitehead (1961). 
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itself in the domain of the affective categories because it has not yet properly 
emerged’ (Simondon 2012, 1). At the boundary between coherence and 
conflict, the technical mentality is always about to emerge when considering 
the range of affective relationships in which it is nested: there is forever more 
to come. It is also coherent when considering it as a snapshot of the spatial 
moment in which it exists. Generating a complex topology of interiority and 
exteriority, and a creative temporality of becoming, technical mentality 
collides with the Speculative Machine in many ways.  
 I will return to these in more detail in the paper that follows, which is 
structured in this way: first, I will venture into Simondon’s concept of 
‘technical mentality’ noted briefly above. Because it is a concept in which the 
possibilities for becoming at the confluence of the technological, biological 
and non-organic are still underway, and which the dynamic development of 
these creatively impacts their very milieu.4 Speculation on modes of 
existence that are materially constructed will need to recognise their relation 
to the emergence of a network that technical mentality announces. This 
places speculation not at the beginning – wondering ‘where to go?’ ‘what to 
do?’ – but in the middle: infused by the matter at hand, constructed as the 
demands of immediate tactical action and strategic planning undergo 
immanent compression.  
                                            
4. ‘Milieu’ is an important concept, one that influences Simondon from the work of one of his 
thesis advisors, Georges Canguilhem. It is a thing’s spatial environment, its material medium, 
and its ontological status as ‘in-between’. This is important to remember when encountering 
this word in this article. See also Brian Massumi’s translator’s notes for A Thousand Plateaus, 
which discusses this concept well (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: xvii).  
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 Following this, I will look at the way that Deleuze and Guattari 
articulate the pragmatics of their creative philosophy. This is because theirs 
is one of the few philosophical articulations that prioritise it as practical, 
creative and, even, innovative work (Brassett 2015). The final section will go 
towards constructing a philosophy and design along which a Speculative 
Machine becomes a vector of creative action. 
 
Technical Mentalities 
I would like to return to the quotation used a little above: ‘technical 
mentality,’ Simondon writes, ‘is coherent, positive, productive in the domain 
of the cognitive schemas, but incomplete and in conflict with itself in the 
domain of the affective categories because it has not yet properly emerged’ 
(Simondon 2012, 1) and emphasise ‘not yet properly emerged’. In 
conversation with the editors of a book called Gilbert Simondon: Being and 
Technology (2012) Massumi notes that the designer is ‘the helpmate of 
emergence’ (De Boever et al. 2012, 26). Collaborator, assistant and spouse, 
the helpmate participates in the production of emergence, in creating the 
conditions for the new from the material of the future and a vision of/from the 
future. Here the short quotation from Alfred North Whitehead used as the 
epigram to this paper is insightful, as it points to concepts Massumi uses 
when discussing Simondon. For Whitehead and Massumi the future acts as 
an attractor for the present, a causal singularity towards which the present 
drifts. I would like to position designers in this space as speculative 
philosophers, constructing the present from the material of the future such 
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that the becoming-future of the present, is also a becoming of the future 
in/as the present (Brassett and Marenko 2015; Brassett and O’Reilly 2015). 
Any sort of designing is therefore a production of future and present 
together, out of the material of each other and is characterised by 
speculation. The modality of the ‘what if?’ discussed so well in scenarios 
work (Booth et al 2009) is therefore crucial also to designing. A designer as 
the ‘helpmate of emergence’ not only maps out the space and time in which 
future and present come together (and tend to the past), but also directs the 
material forms in which all these – future, present, space and time – become: 
emerge. To use Whitehead’s words (1961, 191) designers insert the future in 
the crannies of the present, which is a speculative act. This affects 
Simondon’s technical object too, because the thing with which the helpmate 
collaborates is (for Massumi’s reading of Simondon) the technical object 
itself.  
 All sorts of mentality (human, technical, non-human, non-organic, and 
so on) come together to participate in delivering the emergence of future 
forms. Designers emerge: that is, they create emergence and are the 
outcome of emergence, they should not remain still, for if they do they fall 
into the confinements of stagnation. So, if technical mentalities are also in the 
process of coming about then they are at once occupying with all the other 
mentalities available, in chaos and order, in a zone of indiscernibility (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994) or regime of complexity that supports creative 
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becoming.5 Such an occupation has to happen without totalisation or 
homogenisation of the environment in which it exists, for either of these acts 
will demand stasis, order and, eventually, death. Here is also a place of 
speculation: where coherence and production, incompletion and conflict also 
engage with and emerge from the collaboration of all ‘helpmates’. Thought 
this way the Speculative Machine as thing is of interest (and importance) only 
because it has emerged from a process. This relates the speculative machine 
to the abstract machine invented by Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1987, 1994) 
and put to work well by philosopher Manuel De Landa (1997): 
transcendentally material this abstract machine exists as a kind of blueprint, 
a virtual design, able to be actualised through a number of concrete 
expressions (for example, organisational design, personal relationships, 
geological formation, linguistic structures). It, too, is an outcome of the 
procedures that it performs, living in that complex space where it is always in 
a process of coming about. 
 For De Landa in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997), history 
is an abstract machine that operates in transcendentally complex ways. Such 
that history is not a story with a linear tale of beginning, middle and 
(presumably) end, with idealised and idealising stages following (or 
producing) a steady progress, but rather a fluid mass congealing at certain 
times, coupled with dissolving which releases, and allows for the later 
reincorporation of, a multiplicity of spatial and temporal elements. It is an 
                                            
5. See the work of complexity biologist and philosopher Stuart Kauffman (1993, 2008); who 
is discussed in relation to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, design and innovation in 
Brassett (2015). 
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important point for De Landa that this abstract machine of nonlinear history 
follows principles from other complex sciences (geology, biology and 
linguistics characterise, but do not delimit, his three main sections). So, the 
ways minerals sediment and agglomerate, genes drift and express, or 
languages mutate and evolve, share abstract states and yet are all materially 
actual. If drawn, the blueprint of the abstract machine of history would match 
those of geology, biology and linguistics. Histories, events, concepts, 
minerals, flesh and linguistic forms are expressions of this abstract machine; 
they all involve and evolve, implicate and explicate their material through their 
activities. The reference to expression here brings us back to Spinoza. 
Deleuze explains, in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza: 
 
Expression thus bears within it a double movement: one either takes 
what is expressed as involved, implicit, wound up, in its expression, 
and so retains only the couple ‘expresser-expression’; or one unfolds, 
explicates, unwinds expression so as to restore what is expressed 
(leaving the couple ‘expresser-expressed’). (Deleuze 1990, 333) 
  
The abstract machine works as an engine of expression and an example of 
that expression; it expresses what is involved in it, what is implicit. The 
abstract machine unfolds and explicates too, promoting the evolutionary 
enfolding of its processes and their implications. Thus it is not a simple 
question of rules that must be followed: the abstract machine does not 
construct and enforce rules. It simultaneously illustrates the principles 
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according to which matter expresses itself under different forms and with 
different content, as it is an example of such expression. The very 
performance of history (as De Landa shows, for example) should be the 
material manifestation (expression) of the transcendental conceptualisation of 
the abstract machine. The question that emerges is of the relationship 
between the expressed/expression and the expresser, between the 
(seemingly) different realms of abstraction and reality,6 as praxis (including 
designing) becomes actualised from conceptual conditions. I will return to 
this question of pragmatics in the following section, now I would like to turn 
back to Simondon and his articulation of the role of the machine in technical 
mentality. 
 He writes that ‘the machine is different from the tool in that it is a relay; 
it has two different entry points, that of energy and that of information’ 
(Simondon 2012, 6). While the tool actualises the separation between Human 
Beings (as information source) and Nature (as energy source) – without them 
it is mute – a machine is a nodal point at which flows of energy and 
information come together to create outcomes. As such the machine 
highlights the emergence of a network in which all matter, energy and 
information is connected. This network Simondon calls ‘technical mentality’, 
explaining that ‘the technical mentality can be developed into schemes of 
action and into values, to the point of yielding a morality in human 
environments that are entirely dedicated to industrial production’ (Simondon 
                                            
6. Deleuze’s discussions of virtual and actual – as they come through especially in 
Bergsonism (1988) – would designate another interesting line of enquiry to take at this point. 
De Landa’s more recent thinking (2002) is steeped in such a theme. 
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2012, 8). This is an important point. Technical mentality – the 
transcendentally material networking that emerges from all the elements 
upon which it is constituted being in relation in time and space – is 
expressed in its entirety through any of these elements. The whole (technical 
mentality) does not simply sit at an ontologically removed level above the 
parts (technical objects and the machines that they form) from which it 
comes, but it inserts itself into the mix (Deleuze and Guattari (1984) make a 
similar point). In this way technical mentality is also a measure of the affective 
relations and speeds and slownesses of the system in which it both 
expresses and impresses. The affective ethology announced by Spinoza’s 
body is thus extended into technics. The speeds and slownesses and 
affective capacities of bodies already expose them to the networked and 
impactful power of the elements from which bodies emerge. Even if a ‘human 
environment’ is utterly machinic it is not devoid of pragmatic or ethical 
import. For Simondon when standardised subsets enter modes of existence 
that are special and collective, concentrated and spread out, they engage a 
‘thought-network’ whose relations can develop singular constructions. 
Technical mentality attests to the qualitative and quantitative pressure from 
the pragmatic and ethical impacts of any of the elements that combine to 
make the networks within which they operate.  
 Philosopher of science Bruno Latour is positive about the vectorial 
nature of Simondon’s speculation upon ontology, for its ability to take 
thought in directions other than lazy oppositions. ‘For [Simondon],’ Latour 
writes, ‘subject and object, far from being the beginning of thought like two 
 17 
hooks used to suspend a hammock destined for philosophical snoozing, are 
only the rather belated effects of a real history of modes of existence’ (Latour 
2011, 307). Not only is Simondon’s work able to shake us out of slumbering 
between concepts made comfortable by years of habit, Latour says, but 
does so by focusing upon technology as both a product and producer of 
‘modes of existence’ too. While good work has been done on this in the 
Latour-inspired Science and Technology Studies faction of Sociology – 
attesting to the role of artefacts as nodal points in vast networks of 
connected, affective constructs (on the relation of STS to design see, for 
example, Kimbell 2011, 2012) – design theory is also working in these areas, 
exploding the consequences for all actors in these networks in rethinking the 
ontological status of designed, technological objects (Marenko 2015). 
Furthermore, as Massumi explains: ‘[Simondon] recognized technological 
innovation as a key theatre of thought materializing in matter becoming, in 
ways imbricated with life transformations’ (De Boever et al. 2012, 20). 
Technological innovation draws lines along which matter grows and spreads, 
becoming, allowing modes of existence to emerge, erupting along the way. 
But as well as drawing the possibilities for these modes to emerge, 
technology and innovation are also material instances of this emergence. As 
matter drives its own forming and technology creates the opportunities for 
forming to happen, then the networks along which such morphogenesis 
occurs become key. Each occurrence of form and matter coalescing 
changes the nature of the milieus in which all this happens, which redesigns 
the conditions for possibility of further becoming, throwing everything into 
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new relief. This is a key consideration bearing in mind speculative machines. 
The landing and rippling in the present of future things, reconstitutes the 
nature of the present via its milieu, develops possibilities of its own 
becoming, and the developing of connections between present, future and 
past. Speculation is just such a launch; and the machine is that which is 
drawn along the lines of the connections, disjunctions and conjunctions 
between all actors in the speculation. This is all enfolded in this comment 
from Massumi, where he allies to Simondon’s thinking the chrono- and 
morphogenetic (‘thought materializing in matter becoming’), machinic 
speculation (‘technological innovation as a key theatre of thought 
materializing . . .’) and the role of creativity in all this (‘innovation’ and ‘life 
transformations’).  
 We can see many of these issues surfacing in Simondon’s own 
discussions of technical mentality. He writes: 
 
[the] technical mentality successfully completes itself and rejoins 
nature by turning itself into a thought-network, into the material and 
conceptual synthesis of particularity and concentration, individuality 
and collectivity – because the entire force of the network is available 
to each one of the points, and its mazes are woven together with 
those of the world, the concrete and the particular. (Simondon 2012, 
9) 
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There is so much here to remark upon, so much folded into this single 
sentence, that it exhibits formally the concepts it is concretising. Many of 
Simondon’s concepts are available here in these lines, converging on lines to 
create maximum impact here, in this node, and taking further lines away, 
back out into the various wilds of his theoretical constructions. The force of 
the network, and the forces that ripple and disperse through the network, are 
encompassed in his concept of technical mentality. These forces complete 
and re-join themselves after journeying wide, collecting singular points and 
concentrating collectives. Technical mentality is the emergent whole, and so 
is a particular concept of the whole that joins the parts as a member of the 
multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1984). As Simondon says, technical 
mentality rejoins itself after emerging from the network, but is also – at the 
same time – a particular concept that is able to concentrate itself at any point 
in the network. Technical mentality infuses any particular technical object, or 
any machinic collection of them within a network; and any particular 
technical object and collection into machines will allow for the creative 
reorientation of the possibilities that technical mentality can become.  
 In his On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects Simondon writes 
that the machine, ‘as an element in the technical ensemble, becomes that 
which augments the quantity of information, increases negentropy, and 
opposes the degradation of energy’ (Simondon 1981, 9; translation 
modified). Here we have another coming together of a number of the points I 
have been highlighting in this article so far. First, there is the networked 
nature of the machine as an affective and affected thing. Second, its creative 
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role, from undermining the thermodynamic urge to entropic stasis. Third, the 
primacy of matter’s morphogenesis: in-forming itself through the creation of 
its own negentropic ensembles. The Speculative Machine, as I have been 
positioning it here, is just such a thing.  
 Having encountered technical mentalities and speculative machines, 
then, I would like now to turn to relate these concepts to a pragmatic 
philosophy as evinced by Deleuze and Guattari. This is not only to highlight a 
sense of speculation’s creative aspect, but also to address the everyday 
understanding of the concept that places it outside of practice. 
 
Pragmatic machines 
There are so many places one could begin when discussing pragmatic 
philosophy and speculation – William James and Charles Sanders Peirce to 
name just two – and so much to say that I am not able to encompass it all 
here.7 For this reason I will focus on some of the creative or design-related 
issues in pragmatic philosophy insofar as they have a direct impact upon the 
topic broached here: beginning with Deleuze and Guattari. 
 As Deleuze and Guattari highlight throughout What is Philosophy? 
philosophy is a successfully affective creativity. ‘Philosophy does not consist 
in knowing and is not inspired by truth,’ they write. ‘Rather, it is categories 
like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 82–3). Philosophy is not about truth or falsity, 
                                            
7. Steven Shaviro (2009) encounters speculation and pragmatism/radical empiricism well; 
see also Massumi (2011). 
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but about the interest, success or importance of its creative products and 
processes.8 That is, philosophy is concerned with the ways that its concepts 
impact in their contexts, and the creativity of the processes that create them. 
It is pragmatic – Deleuze and Guattari explain in ‘587 BC–AD 70: On Several 
Regimes of Signs’ from A Thousand Plateaus – in that its creativity is 
generative, transformative, diagrammatic and machinic (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987 139, 145–6). If this was not enough Deleuze and Guattari describe 
pragmatics ‘as a whole’ in terms replete with design language. They write: 
 
Pragmatics as a whole would consist in this: making a tracing of the 
mixed semiotics, under the generative component; making the 
transformational map of the regimes, with their possibilities for 
translation and creation, for budding along the line of the tracings; 
making a diagram of the abstract machines that are in play in each 
case, either as potentialities or as effective emergences; outlining the 
program of the assemblages that distribute everything and bring a 
circulation of movement with alternatives, jumps, and mutations. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 146–7; original emphases) 
 
An interesting, successful pragmatic philosophy will be tracing mixtures, 
mapping generations, diagramming abstract-real relations and programming 
                                            
8. Deleuze and Guattari are clear about the criteria they use to judge success (or otherwise) 
of philosophy; not only the ‘interesting’, ‘remarkability’ or ‘importance’ of What is 
Philosophy? (1994) but also the principles of rhizomatic writing or Body without Organs 
production of A Thousand Plateaus (1987), or the blueprint for schizoanalytic desiring 
machine production of Anti Oedipus (1984), among many other examples across their work. 
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machines. Its creativity will be characterised by these practices. For 
Massumi, writing in Semblance and Event, pragmatics is not ‘practical as 
opposed to speculative or theoretical. It is a synonym for composition’ 
(Massumi 2011, 12; original emphasis). A pragmatic philosophy creates: it 
composes, fabricates, connects, mixes and changes; it designs. It is thus a 
Speculative Machine. 
 Mixing and combining are important aspects of discursive, ‘semiotic’, 
regimes as Deleuze and Guattari discuss in the part of A Thousand Plateaus 
from which the references to pragmatics above come. For them semiotic 
regimes are never pure, always crossing and combining with others to 
generate a complexity of content and form of expressions in which simple 
recourses to meaning via interpretation are never adequate. This is why their 
engagement with pragmatics here is telling, especially pragmatics 
considered as tracing, mapping, designing and programming. The creative 
combinatorics announced by pragmatics is also a production of regimes that 
feedback into a whole complex of machinic networks where distribution of 
control and power accompany urges to meaning and truth. We remain close 
to Simondon on technical mentality here. As we have seen, this concept 
expresses the networked-ness of the assemblages into which any technical 
objects always find themselves. Such networks should not simply be seen 
structurally however; Simondon emphasises that technical object ‘is not only 
structure but also regime’ (Simondon 2012, 13; original emphasis). The 
technical mentality announces not only that its objects exist in a relationship 
with others, but also that this relationality becomes a way of considering the 
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ontological status of any objects that come into contact, combination or 
mixture with it.  
 Discursive regimes tethering constructs to particular meanings, then, 
may dominate in any creative context, but such domination may not 
necessarily entail stability or permanence. Ontologies enacted in structures 
and regimes, through relations, and flavoured by the mentalities of the 
networks thus generated, are themselves in processes of coming about. For 
Simondon – and for Deleuze insofar as he follows the work of Simondon – 
the ontogenetic describes the process of being’s never-ending coming 
about. While this issue of ontogenesis and the becoming of being is not the 
focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning here as it shows that in pragmatic 
creativity, in tracing, mapping, designing and programming, in bringing 
together a range of things into machining networks that have affect, such 
mixing does not necessarily homogenise or totalise into fixed ontological 
positions. 
 I say ‘not necessarily’, but this does not mean ‘not every time’ of 
course. The mixture of semiotic regimes that Deleuze and Guattari examine 
show that while they are always open onto each other, blockages can be 
produced by regimes seeking domination and control, stasis and conformity. 
Such drives however will provide leakages worth following, moments where 
the drives to totalise are undermined by ‘minor’ currents signifying, 
ontologising, practicing and creating in different ways (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1986). Moreover, it is not only the fact of being mixed that should permeate 
all semiotic regimes, but also of promoting mixing, of generating never-
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ending mixing. In any case the assemblage that gives rise to the regimes that 
it mixes, and to regimes that mix, will have parts that mutate or congeal as 
they face their many different directions. Deleuze and Guattari explain: 
 
Semiotic systems depend upon assemblages, and it is the 
assemblages that determine that a given people, period, or language, 
and even a given style, fashion, pathology, or miniscule event in a 
limited situation, can assure the predominance of one semiotic or 
another. We are trying to make maps of regimes of signs: we can turn 
them around or retain selected coordinates or dimensions, and 
depending on the case we will be dealing with a social formation, a 
pathological delusion, a historical event, etc. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 119)  
 
Deleuze and Guattari here use the term ‘regimes’ to describe the spaces of 
practice or activity, that engage and express, inform and impress, the 
systems of control and power that produce these practices and activities. 
These regimes that cut across network types of order, chaos and complexity 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994; Brassett 2013, 2015) are not distinct regions 
with easily demarcated borders, but shifting locales with many different 
points of entry, barriers, or zones of indiscernibility between them, and 
moments of eruption of the one into the other. Their different creative 
moments – where chaotic coalesces into islands of order and frozen edifices 
dissolve into chaos (Serres 1982; Kauffman 1993, 2008) – relate to each 
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other in dynamic ways. A regime’s dynamism, constraint development, 
material production and relationships to other regimes are immanent, 
therefore. For Deleuze and Guattari semiotic regimes mix and combine, 
create and construct, they provide few opportunities for purity of expression 
and occur as becomings into and from each other. Each is a different way of 
constructing the assemblage that they all constitute, and by which they are 
constituted. The chaotic tends towards complete dissolution; the ordered 
rigidifies to oppressive stagnation; and the complex does both, partially, 
undoing what is ordered, and bringing consistency to chaos. The regimes of 
signs Deleuze and Guattari discuss are themselves complex assemblages, 
with the regime affording complexity and the status as assemblage.  
 Simondon uses ‘regimes’ in a way that connects to both but takes a 
new direction, one that is worth following here. For him a regime marks the 
field of possibilities from which any particular mode of existence can be 
expressed. This relates to the thermodynamic concept ‘metastability’ – which 
is a key concept in Simondon’s work – with interesting correspondences to 
the relations between order, chaos and complexity mentioned above. If 
stable states (regimes of order) have no opportunity to actualise any potential 
because it has all been used up, and completely unstable states (chaos) can 
generate nothing, then the metastable state exists in a regime of (complex) 
possibilities where creative generation of the new can occur. Metastability 
attests to a complexity of possibilities that can never be exhausted either by 
being used up (becoming stable and ordered) or utterly dissipated (unstable 
and chaotic). Regimes are such metastable positions: encompassing the 
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complex assemblages from which machines can emerge as speculative, 
transcendentally pragmatic, possibility projections. So when Simondon says, 
as mentioned above, that the technical object ‘is not only structure but also 
regime’ (2012, 13; original emphasis), it points to the way in which each 
technical object is related to a whole network, and exhibits the mentality of 
the technical network in the production of its existence. It is complex, and 
gestures both to order and chaos in its position of metastability.  
 I stated above that an interesting, successful pragmatic philosophy 
following Deleuze and Guattari, would trace mixtures, map generations, 
diagram abstract-real relations and programme machines. We have just 
navigated the creative generation offered by mixing, and already 
encountered the machinic opportunities proposed by the parts and wholes of 
assemblages. A focus upon pragmatics can draw the abstract machine away 
form abstraction towards material speculation. With this is activated a whole 
array of modes of existence that exhibit technical mentality when they 
engage technological, industrial networks. Speculative Machines are the 
innovative driver of such mentalities.  
 It seems to me that the designerly approach to such pragmatics is 
also placed within the speculative realm. The transcendental diagram of the 
abstract machine, as we have seen, expresses its concrete material 
outcomes. Designing is crucial here. It brings the future into the present 
(thereby changing/creating both space and time), and articulates the material 
affects that everything within its generative space-time has with everything 
else (including their space-times). This is its speculative function: a 
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speculation that machines and participates in, involves and evolves, the 
technical mentality that emerges. 
 
Last thoughts, but not the end 
In ‘Crystals and Membranes: Individuation and Temporality’, Anne 
Sauvagnargues grows her thoughts about Simondon around the crystal: ‘the 
Simondonian example par excellence’ (Sauvagnargues 2012, 59). This is 
because it involves a seed, a supersaturated solution and a growing of form 
from matter as a morphogenetic becoming. She writes: 
 
The crystalline solution, a pre-individual milieu in a metastable state, 
can only begin to emerge, begin to crystallize, on this condition: that a 
seed, which must ‘resonate’ with the milieu in order to produce 
disparation,9 be introduced, to which the individual responds as a 
resolution of the problem. (Sauvagnargues 2012, 60)  
 
I would like to position Speculative Machines as the crystal here: growing 
from the relationship between a singularity and its context, generating its 
own temporality that takes it outside of the entropic sea within which all else 
sinks. A singularity that can infiltrate the space as a speck, an irritant, and 
                                            
9. Alberto Toscano in a conference presentation posits ‘the possibility of envisaging the 
concept of disparation as a non-dialectical but nevertheless political conceptualisation of 
conflict and transformation’ (Toscano 2007, 1). While examining the role of disparation in the 
terms I have been elucidating here would warrant further research, it is clear that this 
concept relates to the position of speculation as machinic, creative and networked. 
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once ‘resonating’ with that milieu, all can emerge.  Infiltrate or as we have 
seen following Whitehead, insert. When inserting the future in the crannies of 
the present designers are taking future specks to grow the present as a 
crystal in the material medium and environment that already resonate with 
future and present possibilities. Speculative Hardware is one such irritant, 
inserting itself as an outcast from the future in the middle of a present that 
becomes itself only once it has adjusted its medium to allow the future to 
resonate. The other line we need to bring back into this moment is the 
pragmatic.  
 Such irritating event creation may seem like magic, but it is certainly 
not ideal. For a present announced by Speculative Machines to crystallise, 
not only does it need an environment receptive to the resonances it offers, 
but also an act of placing, of insertion, of – to recall Stengers’s term – 
infection. These acts have to be designed. But this is not to be taken simply, 
not hylomorphically, not with some energised, vivid designer transferring 
some of his power to form inert matter, as re-presentations of God. Rather – 
and this is Simondon’s great gift to those of us working across boundaries of 
design, philosophy and many others – forming is an emergent behaviour of 
all matter. Sauvagnargues puts it well: 
 
Far from being external to the matter which it transforms, form acts at 
the level of forces and functions as a signal: that is, as an instance of 
information capable of catalysing a process through the irruption of an 
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emergent singularity in a system, engaging disparities in a system of 
correspondence. (Simondon 2012, 64) 
 
Speculative Hardware is one such erupting emergent singularity. Its form 
emerges from the context in which it operates, and allows that milieu to 
emerge on its own line of becoming. The designer (inserting, infecting, 
affecting, and so on) is thus also the milieu: the material, the environment, 
and in the middle of it all, as John O’Reilly 2015 shows when he investigates 
the concept of milieu (via Canguilhem and Deleuze and Guattari) in relation to 
the work of illustrators Saul Steinberg and Chris Ware. The designer 
becomes the work, as it becomes him or her, and all becomings affect space 
and time. A force itself, Speculative Machines’ becomings are also particular 
expressions of technical mentality and are proof of its (technical mentality’s) 
generation of creative possibilities. Any Speculative Machine will articulate 
and express the technical particularities and collectives of the networks 
within which it operates at any one time. As such it is not only an instantiation 
of the spaces within which it exists in all its topological complexity, but also 
creates new temporal opportunities.  
 I would like to finish by referring to the second of the quotations used 
as epigrams to this paper: the one by Isabelle Stengers (2011), who writes:  
 
Speculative philosophy is not about giving a plausible account of what 
exists but about approaching each society with the question of what it 
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might be capable of, and this capacity designates not its judgements 
but the interstices to which it provides shelter. (Stengers 2011, 509)  
 
Speculative Machines as I have sought to construct them here already posit 
themselves as refugees from the future, hacking into our fleeting present, 
providing glimpses of the modal possibilities for becoming more than what 
we are. ‘What if we were to become thus?’ they suppose, and at that 
moment the line of flight this announces is already underway. They insert 
themselves into the crannies of the present, lurk in these interstices, erupt 
from their midsts: becoming, emerging. Like Oxman’s digital machines that I 
mention at the opening of this essay, Speculative Machines take us away 
from the instrumentality of the present into the creative possibilities that this 
present may become, and do so by burrowing into its cracks. With the affect 
that each society becomes criss-crossed, interrupted, disrupted and 
regenerated by the technical mentalities all its machines – abstract and real, 
actual and speculative – create. Those of us who create – things and 
concepts and all – would do well to attend to the affective networks, the 
Technical Mentalities, within which our creations exist, and the opportunities 
they allow for further creative expression. 
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